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Crisis management is defined to be the expansion
of the commitments on an organization beyond the
capability its normal resources to respond
adequately to all of them. Crisis commitments are
imposed with relatively short notice, with vague
prioritization, and without the privelege of reclaraa
by the organization. Under conditions of goal conflict
and workday extension, the organization and its
environment are statically and dynamically modelled tc
demonstrate the critical nature of the tise element in
the management of crises. An in-depth analysis of the
supporting situational elements within the Navy is
conducted. Emphasis is placed on the structure of the
Navy bureaucracy and its effectiveness in the unstable
environment which the milita ry faces. The
contribution of bureaucracy to the
institutionalization of crisis management as a
standard procedure is examined. The sociological
norms of individual behavior which are operant in
maintaining the crisis management standard are also
emphasized. Recommendations for further research and
for interim actions to remedy this dysfunctional
symptom are proposed.
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The term "crisis management" has become greatly
popularized in recent years and has been used to descrine
conditions in a wide variety of institutional and
organizational settings. These settings range from the micro
level of how one handles the personal changes affecting his
life (e. g. , Passages by Gail Sheehy) to the macro level of
how to defuse a nuclear confrontation between the major
world powers (e. g., Essence of Decision by Graham Alliscn)
.
The analyses of these situations has concentrated on the
Mechanics of managing the crisis, but they have very rarely
analyzed crisis management as a symptom of more complex and
deeply rccted organizational dysfunctions.
The visibility given to crisis management by the Navy
began in October 1976 when the Chief of Naval Operations
Master Chief Petty Officer advisory panel identified it as
the single greatest contributor to dissatisfaction with life
in the military. Unfortunately, the subsequent analysis has
fallen prey to a mechanical superficiality also. The
investigations and actions of the Commander in Chief, united
States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and of the Commander,
United States Naval Surface Forces, Pacific (COBNAVSU FF PAC)
keyed on relatively short-term, easily resolvable issues
which, when viewed from a systemic perspective, were only
symptoms of larger problems.* That resolution had net, in
fact, taken place was indicated by the resurrection of a
V
slightly different crisis aanageuant "monster" by the
publication of the article "Get Off My Back, Sir" in the
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (August, 1977).
Again, ooth analysis and actions were superficial in nature,
but the publicity afforded crisis management in the Navy was
even more widespread in this latter case. As an indication
of the pervasive nature of crisis management, in his 1973
State of the Union address to Congress and the nation,
President Carter tasked us all to eliminate crisis
management as a routine way of doing business.
MTH CE M0NSTE3
After reviewing some of the theoretical and practical
background of organizations and conflict resolution, an
operational definition of crisis management will be
provided. 3oth the organization and its environment will be
modelled in order to demonstrate some of the constr active
dynamics which take place under crisis management conditions
as well as under normal operating conditions. Time will oe
viewed as the critical element which produces either crisis
cr more normal management by the organization. Again, irodels
will oe provided to assist in understanding some of tae
effects on the people and on the organization. The
interactive characteristics of the Navy structure and the
behavioral norms of the individuals within the Navy are
supportive of crisis management as "standard operating
procedure". These will be analyzed and related to the
definition and the models provided. A prognosis for the
future of crisis management in the Navy and recommendations





The term crisis management has oeen bandied about with
consider atle freedom in recent years. However, a major
problem with the many analyses of crisis conditions and the
management cf them is the nearly total absence of a
definition of crisis management. 3y neglecting to provide a
workable, realistic, acceptable definition of the subject of
the study, it is left up to the individuals to determine if
.the actions are appropriate to their own concepts of "crisis
management". An approximate definition must be derived
contextually ty the reader. If an attempt is made to address
some of the characteristics of crisis management, one
usually winds up with little more than platitudes. The
comments in most management texts and articles which address
crisis management at all can be "pigeonholed" into cne of
four categories. These are:
(1) Poor management. "The recurrent crisis is simply a
symptom of slovenliness and laziness." (Drucker, 1967, p.
42) .
(2) Poor planning. "Too cfter management feels that its
jcb is to cope with problems as they arise ("crisis
management") rather than to anticipate the problems and to
take steps to mitigate their impact." (Morrison, 1967, p.
42) .

(3) Satisfaction derived from management by crisis.
Although caused by "lack of planning, unrealistic time
estimates, problem orientation, and the reluctance of
subordinates to break bad news", the manager finds the
solving of here-and-now problems to be greatly satisfying to
the image of a manager as a problem-solver (Mackenzie, 1972,
p. 174) .
(4) Poor time management. "Managing time also involves
anticipating future needs and taking preventive
organizational action. ... If delayed, organizational
change frequently takes place in an atmosphere of crisis,
adding a major handicap to an already difficult process."
(Uyterhoven et. al., 1S77, p. 84).
The foregoing attempts to address crisis management are
simplistic and superficial. In most cases, crisis management
is viewed as an individual characteristic and not as an
organizational phenomenon, although some theorists have
alluded to ccaplex organization structures as precipitators
of confusing and conflicting demands on the subordinates
because of too many bosses. The methods suggested to
resolve the condition are only partially useful due to their
limited scope. If the manager, Navy or civilian, is to be
provided with really useful tools to deal with crisis
management, the problem must be defined in such a iranner
that it includes the structure of the organization, the
norms of the individuals within that organization, and an






Producing a definition of crisis management can be
likened to attempting to contain and gather up all the
pieces of a bombshell which has burst in the air: many
pieces of varying sizes going off in many different
directions at various speeds. Organization theory provides
the broad case upon which a definition can be built.
Organization theory enables us to define and to analyze
the structure of the units, the systems, and the overall
organization under -review. There are three components cf tne
organization structure which are of direct concern here:
the formal organization, the informal organization and the
ncnformal organization.
C) 2he formal organization. This can be considered as
the hierarchy which is normally defined en organization
charts and in operating manuals.
"Tne formal organization is that part of the
organization consciously planned to acnieve a purpose
or a goal. It specifies tasks to be performed in
positions or offices. Rules a r.d procedures establish
ooth requirements for admission and departure froir
positions and tne organization and, also, tne general
behavioral requirements while in tne organization. It
also provides the means of linking individual
performances to objectives through a system of
control or coordination." As a division of work, is
established, the type and the magnitude of the
coordination to be provided is influenced. For the
organization planner then, the decisions he makes tc
solve one set of problems creates and determines, in
part, anctner set with which he will have tc
contend." (Litterer, 1969, p. 71).
A detailed analysis of the characteristics of the Navy
formal organization will be deferred until Chapter IV.
(2) The informal oia^nization. This is commonly referred
1 1

to as the "shadow" organization that exists within tne
formal organization. It is characterized by being loosely
organized, flexible, ill-defined, as having a very vague
membership where the purpose of the interactions are
generally unclear, one where tne goals are net specified and
which is not subject to manageme r,t control tut operates on
group norms and conformity, and one with a highly
conditional leadership. It exists to "offer the individual
satisfaction of the social need, a sense cf belonging and
identification, knowledge of approved behavior, sympathy,
assistance, and an opportunity for influence and creativity"
(Hicks and Gullet, 1975). Every formal organization will
have an informal organization cf some type (Argyris, 1960)
;
it will have varying power and influence, and the
effectiveness of the formal organization is frequently
determined by the manner and tne atmosphere of tne
interactions between the two.
(3) ?he ncnformal organization . This organization has
the same general characteristics as the informal
organization, except that the individuals "reach outside
their formal structure for vital information and assistance"
(Stephens, 1977). The distinction is that the nonformai
organization is not constrained to remain within the
boundaries as established by the formal structure but may
reach across multiple organizations and several hierarchical
levels within the various component organizations.
Organization theory also provides us with a much-needed
analytic framework within which we can examine tne
environment of the organizations. Variously referred to as a
"turbulent field" (Emery and Trist 1973), as "unstable"
(Burns and Stalker, 1961), today's organizational
environments are characterized oy an ever increasing
complexity of human, technological, regulatory, physical and
economic demands. Not only are all these factors changing,
12

but the rate of change is increasing (Toffler, 1970). The
predictability of the environment is decreasing, and the
pressures on the organization can become unbearable unless
there is some protective mechanism it can use to insulate
itself from all of this. Chapter III will provide an
analysis of one insulating buffer wnich may protect the
organization to some extent.
Organization theory, finally, enaoles us to tetter
understand the processes that occur within the various
organizations, especially in the area of how decisions are
made and hew problems are defined. This area provides us
with a descriptive model (hew it really is) of the
organization vice the more general normative model (how it
should be). March and Simon (1958) have described these
organization processes as:
(1) Dealing with factored problems. The problem is
broken down into manageable bits, and any conflict is
guasi-rescl ved by dealing with the oits in a sequential
manner. Often the view of the whole is lost.
(2) Satisficing. The first alternative encountered which
meexs all the minimum criteria is accepted. It maj not be
the optimum solution for that organization or that
situation
.
(3) Problemistic search. The search foi a solution does
not begin until a problem has been identified, ar.d the
solution is specific for that problem. There is no
motivation to take a larger perspective or to acquire
•general solutions, nor is there motivation to pursue
organizational maintenance until someone declares that a
crisis is present.
(4) uncertainty avoidance. There is a great deal of
13

uncertainty about the distant future with which managers are
generally uncomfortable. This discomfort can be reduced by
dealing with the pressing problems of today 7ice the
long-run strategies necessary for the future.
(5) Repertories. The manager has stock programs for
handling those types cf problems he considers as recurrent.
The exact fit of answer to problem is rare, hut not as rare
as the manager's awareness of this fact.
The several approaches to conflict resolution
(interpersonal, intergroup, and internaticnal) have all
addressed crisis phenomena at their own levels and thus
provide essential building blocks for the development cf a
definition of crisis management. Clinical psychology also
includes perspectives of crisis situations which will be
useful. These approaches are situational, but the
conclusions and dynamics which they present are applicable
to a systemic theory.
Studies of interpersonal conflict provide the concept of
differentiating between conflict which is confronted and
that which is being ignored. Any conflict which is cf a
major nature to one or more parties and which is not
addressed openly will remain as a dysfunctional element in
the organizational functioning, albeit one which may be
operant below the surface level. The probability of eruption
into open hostility (and thus establishing conditions of
organizational crisis) is increased with the complexity of
the situation at hand, the iirportance of the situation, and
the freguency of interaction among the participants. The
point which is repeatedly emphasized is that there are two
ways of addressing the conflict: resolution, "such that the
original differences or feelings of opposition no longer
exist," and control, "whereby the negative consequences of
the conflict are decreased, even though the opposing
14

preferences and antagonisms persist" (Walton, 1968).
aesoluticn is, of course, the much preferred methcd of
addressing conflict, but it is much more difficult fcr tne
manager to deal with the feelings of tne conflicting
individuals in an open and honest manner. It is also
possible that the concept of totally resolving any conflict
is Utopian and invalid.
It should not be inferred from the fcregcing that all
conflict is undesireable and must be resclvel (or at least
controlled) as soon as it arises. An organization that
attempts to operate in this fashion soon loses its
capability tc innovate. Several of the benefits of conflict
have been pointed out ty Mack and Snyder (1957):
(1) "Conflict sets grouo boundaries by str engtheninc
group cchesiveness and separat eness.
"
(In ether words, a group of persons which is in conflict
with another group will be drawn closer together, a joining
cf forces, if you will, and differences between the groups
will be emphasized.)
(2) "Conflict reduces tension and permits maintenance
of social interaction under stress."
(This means that an open confrontation of conflicting
parties will reduce the tension within the group and permit
mere cooperative functioning of that group.)
(3) "Conflict clarifies objectives."
(By challenging the goals cf the group, the various




(U) "Conflict results in the establisnment of group
norms.
"
(Norms are those unwritten standards of individual
behavior which govern the actions of group members. They are
required to prevent chaos, and they function to control the
nature of conflict within the group.)
(5) "Without conflict, accomodative relations would
result in subordination rather taan agreement."
(In other words, decisions would not be challenged, and
the needs and desires of subordinates would not become
known.
)
Intergroup conflict studies provide many -fascinating
cases in ths dynamics of today's world, and they contribute
an awareness -chat a failure to recognize and deal with a
change in social values will inevitably precipitate crises
(Katz, 1967). The nature of the crisis is extremely
situational, of course, and may range from an overthrew of
the government to relocating the soft drink, machines in tne
workers' lounge. An appropriate intergroup dynamic which
must be recognized is that nearly all internal and
interpersonal conflict in an organization is subdued when
that system is subject to an external crisis or threat
(Dynes and Quarantelli, 1971). This can be observed
frequently in Navy ships where there is a great deal of
internal strife and interdepartmental conflict but which
immediately unifies into a coherent and very indignant group
front when aspersions are cast upon the capabilities of that
snip or her crew by an outsider.
In his studies of international conflict, Katz (1965)
has identified forces which can be marshalled to promote
conflict as well as those which can oe utilized to constrain
16

the conflict. Although he was dealing with the international
scale, these same forces can be reduced tc an individual or
group level. Those forces in the individual which can be
"aroused for his assumption of national roles" are:
"(1) Emotional and behavioral conditioning tc
national symbols,
"(2) The sense of personal identity as a national,
"(3) Compensatory and defensive identification with
militant nationalism,
"(4) Instrumental involvement in the national
structure." (p. 423) .
These same forces would apply to an individual as a member
of the crew of a ship cr to a player on a baseball team.
The techniques which Katz has identified for dealing
with conflict on an international oasis, that is, for
"advancing their cause, for living with tensions, cr for
bringing an end to the conflict" are:




"(3) Conflict restriction and containment,
"(4) Ncnviclence and ideological conversion,
"(5) Bargaining and compromise, and
"(6) Problem-solving and creative integration."
(p. 431) .
As with the forces to mobilize for international conflicts,
these latter quelling forces are alsc applicable to the
individual and group levels.
The subject cf international conflict has been addressed
17

from the perspective of clinical psychology by Babad and
Solomon. In considering war as crisis (perhaps the ultimate
crisis), they have found that many cf the dynamics which
they were observing were not limited to the war but were in
fact being carried over from and oack into the everyday
management cf organizations. They have observed that during
war
:
(1) There is, net surprisingly, a disruption of
organizational functioning witn a high need for
improvisation on the part of the leader. There is a high
threat level, not only to personal safety and security, but
also to the capabilities of the leader as a professional.
His response to this latter threat is perceived as having a
significant impact on his future career in the service.
(2) There is a tendency of the leader to project a
crisis where there is none or to project a worse situation
than actually exists. This provides him with the opportunity
to solve tne crisis and to magnify his worth and his
visibility tc the higher levels in the hierarchy.
(3) The field commander typically has a nearly
overwhelming operational overload, i. e. , more to do than he
possibly can accomplish. This is compounded by an
informational overload, frequently referred tc as having too
much correct information. (This latter apparent paradox is
a result of large guantities cf accurate information which
has little or no relevance to the tactical or strategic
situation. Sorting through these data consumes a great deal
of time tetter spent in ether decision areas.)
(4) When placed in a decision situation where his career
is perceived as being in jeopardy, the leader resorts to
some sort of defensive behavior in order to "save face" and




(5) Decisions are usually based on unchecked assumptions
aoout subordinates and superiors as well as about
environmental and situational elements.
Clinical psychology has provided another insight into
the inner workings of organizations by expanding the
analysis of crises arising from the major life changes of
individuals, such as the death of a spouse. Four distinct
stages in the crisis responses of individuals and of
organizations have been identified (Caplan, 1964):
(1) An initial rise in tension due to a situation
calling for the organism to produce problem-solving
responses
.
(2) A further rise in tension when the efforts to
resclve the situation are ineffective, and a feeling of
helplessness begins to set in.
(3) A still further rise in tension accompanied ty an
emergency mobilization of internal and external resources.
(U) Disorganization or disorientation if the problem is
not resolved or avoided.
The development of crises on the organizational level
have been observed to be the result of certain
"administrative demands":
"(1) Administrative demands for changed employee
behavior that employees cannot avoid.
"(2) Demands for changed employee behaviors by
administrators who are perceived by employees to be
uncaring or distant.
"(3) Demands for changed employee behaviors by
administrators who are consistent, persistent, anc
insistent regarding institution of the changes.
19

"(4) Administrative demands for changed employee
behavior when those demands are not supported by
either middle-management personnel or cy employee
leaders." (Mandell and Zacker, 1977, p. 367).
The Navy's Human Resource Management System provides an
example of these administrative demands (as well as the
sometimes subtle nature of the crises) . Units are scheduled
for Human Resource Availabilities (HSAV's) by higher
authority. The unit has little or no input tc this schedule,
ncr does it have a choice about whether or net it will have
the HRAV (administrative demands 1 and 2). The HRAV
reguirement is firmly institutionalized at the CIMCEACFLT
level, as are the principles of management which are
presented during the HRAV. These principles and the
benaviors which they entail are very different from these
encountered in actual practice in the fleet (administrative
demands 3 and 4) . Accordingly, it is frequently observed
that little more than lip-service is actually paid to the
Human Resource Management Centers at the upper and middle
levels (as will be developed in Chapter IV, these persons
"icnow how one really_ needs to act" in order tc succeed). The
lower levels become confused by hearing one thing and having
another modelled for them. This creates a crisis of
leadership consistency within the unit and usually results
in significant organizational stress.
There are, however, administrative actions which can be
associated with a satisfactory outcome cf the crisis
(decreased tensions and increased organizational
capability)
, i. e. ,
"(1) Those that promote employee input into the
process and the mechanics of the administrative
reguir ements.
"(2) Those that promote employee participation in the




" (3) Those that support the development or
appropriate internal and external resources for
employees to fulfill the administrative requirements
.
"(4) Those that have firm requirements that the
changes become institutionalized.'* (Ibid).
Ihese contributions from psychology will be particularly
valuable in the understanding of the behavioral norms which
influence Navy leaders.
In ordar to create a satisfactory definition of crisis
management, there must be an integration of the above areas:
interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict, international
conflict, and psychological analysis of crisis.* This will ne
done in a contextual manner during the model development and
the presentation of systemic elements supporting crisis
management. It will entail a differentiation between crisis
management (an organizational dysfunction) and management of
crisis (a managerial skill) . It must also be recognized
that the structure cf the Navy, the ncrms of individual
behavior (those arising from both the formal and the
informal organizations), the environment within which Navy
leaders operate, and the incidence of crisis management are
all intertwined and are mutually supportive. To arteipt to
change any or all of these in its entirety is not only
impractical, but there is a substantial case for such
actions being not particularly desireable. However,
continuing the status quo is dysfunctional and may prove to
be catastrophic in the relatively near future. In view of
the decreasing population of service-aged males and the low
retention rates currently being experienced, any element
which adversely impacts on the management of the Navy and on
the individual's confidence in ais leaders and in tne
organization as a whole must be addressed immediately.
Action to remedy that situation is essential. If a problem
is highlighted and not addressed at its root level shortly
thereafter, unfulfilled expectations will increase, anc the
21

degree of dissatisfaction will actually rise. Despite the
"problem-solving" approach used too often in the past, the




III. DEFINITION AND MODELS
A. CRISIS MANAGEMENT DEFINED
A crisis situation is created by the short- notice
introjection of one or more additional commitments into an
organization's already full schedule. It is characterized by
vague guidance as to the relative importance of the new
commitment in comparison to existing ones, and there is
generally no opportunity afforded for the unit to request
reconsideration of the imposition. Thus there are four
elements to the definition of crisis management:
(1) Additional requirements en an already full schedule.
Ihis expands the commitments on the organization beyonc the
capability of its normal resources to respond adequately to
all of them. This expansion may be internal to tne
organization due to an oversight on its o«n part, but more
typically it is due to the external imposition of an
additional commitment. There is also the situation of an
internal oversight precipitating a crisis, yet it is usually
perceived by the organization as externally imposed because
it is the external source (superior) which brings it to the
organization's attention.
(2) Short notice. Ihis precludes or reduces the time
available for planning as well as for action. Models of tne
time dimension will be presented later in this chapter.
(3) Vague prioritization. Although there is more to oe
23

done than can reasonably be expected cf the organization,
that organization receives little assistance in determining
what has to be done first. This, of course, opens the door
for the well-recognized case of the urgent overriding the
important (Drucker, 1967; Mackenzie, 1972) , i. e. , one in
which the organization spends most of its time putting out
brush fires while the real business goes unattended. Since
priorities must be set by the subordinate level
organization, they are usually a function of the perceived
power (or the relative seniority in the direct
chain-of-command) of the source of the commitment.
(4) No opportunity for reconsideration. The lack of
reclama or opportunity for negotiation over its own fate
strains the organization's sense of justice since it has had
no " day in court". Such negotiation would include net only
the new, short-notice commitment but also the overall
organizational worklcading. It is usually pcssible to make
trade-offs which the subordinate organization would consider
eguitable without affecting the mission capability of the
unit, but the appropriate negotiations seldom take place,
however. This element fulfills the second and third
administrative action which promotes organizational crisis
as set forth by Mandell and Zacker (Chapter II, Section 3,
cage 19) .
An organization operating under crisis management
conditions would be classified as "head down, tail up ,f . It
is an organization which is overburdened, understaffed,
operating in a reactive mode, unsure or the importance of
the events facing it, and with little or no recourse but to
"keep on plugging away". Althogh this is net a particularly
pretty picture, it must be recognized that it is not
atypical for Navy units to operate in this manner.
2U

B. MAHAG2HENT OF CRISES
Management of crisis is the way in which an organization
or, more particularly, the organization's leaders go about
resolving the crisis situation as described above. This
real-world organizational response to crisis management can
be illustrated oy reviewing the managerial styles and
approaches to crisis of two very different organizations.
The first group to be reviewed has a rather lax
managerial style: there is a great deal of freedom for group
or individual decisions, leader participation is
unstructured and minimized, event sequences are poorly
regulated, and information is provided only when requested.
This style has been given the appellation "laissez-faire"
(Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939) . Generally, the
requirements on the organization are fairly well-known
internally, having been emphasized by the leader's oral
admonitions. Planning has been rather informal (in Navy
parlance, it is referred to as "wheel book" management, i.
€., operating out of a notebook ihich the supervisor carries
in his hip pocket) . The lack of prioritization in this
organization insures that the method of addressing each
problem will be a function of the aindframe cf the leader.
In other words, subordinates do not normally have very raany
standard procedures upon which they can rely. Each situation
must be handled on a contingent basis.
This laissez-faire organization responds to crisis
management in a relatively calm manner because reactive
management is the standard operating procedure (perhaps the
only one). The leader must review tne commitnents facing the
organization and redefine his mental image. Until this is
done and the subordinates advised of the revised "plan",
everyone in the group icust play a "guess a priority" game.
25

The smooth functioning of the organizati.cn at this point
depends a great deal on how well the subordinates know tae
superior and how accurate is their prediction of his new
concept of the goals to be realized in the immediate future.
The situation is often marked by the overlooking of some
element in the overall picture which precipitates another
crisis, and so on ad infinitum. Those projects which are of
relatively low priority and which are abandoned will
generally die (Drucker, 1967) .
The Navy has established numerous requirements, however,
which make this type of organization an anachronism. The
current procedures for formal planning, for review of those
plans oy seniors in the chain of command, and the mere
sophisticated management techniques being introduced into
the fleet, all of which are increasingly monitored by
inspections and "assist" teams, insure that the
laissez-faire organization is a dinosaur facing extinction.
The "modern" Navy organization is well aware of the many
commitments which it must accomodate. This is a result of an
extensive promulgation of schedules and the procedure to be
followed in accomplishing most tasks (often in such detail
that a daily checklist is provided) . Planning is formal:
there are official, agenda-run meetings with minutes
provided to all attendees, all plans of action which are
developed are published and reviewed frequently, and the
order of the events is considered to establish the priority.
This planning is based on a quantification of the resources
with which the organization can work. These resources are
dollars, pecple (converted to manhours) , and the time frame
between the present and the due date.
This latter organization reacts to crisis management in
a mere logical, precise, and predictable manner than the
former. The reaction is, however, a much mere frantic one.
26

Because the resources were fully defined and quantified,
they could be rationally allocated to the various tasks en a
prioritized hasis until either the resources or the tasks
ran out (it is highly unlikely that there would be more
resources than tasks in organizations attempting to reduce
the work week to sixty hours) . The imposition of a new task
means that there are nc resources with which to address the
new commitment. This is an immediate and intuitive
conclusion made by the managers cf the organization as well
as by the workers within it. But intuitive conclusions do
not meet those criteria for formal planning under which the
unit operates. A revision of the plan cf action is made. The
new priorities are again a function of the power of the
originator of the new commitment because nc other criteria
have been provided.
The planning itself becomes the source of a new dilemma
for the organization: there is a certain minimum of
information which must be available in order to conduct a
meaningful planning session; collection of this information
takes time; the time used to collect the information takes
away from the time available for action on the task; action
may not commence until until the planning is fairly well
completed; the time span has been critically reduced in tne
first place in order to meet the criteria for crisis
management. Accordingly, the unit, although attempting to
Flan in a reasonable manner, assumes a "flail state" while
trying tc sort out the problems and the solutions. Tne
extensive adoption of standard procedures has provided
categorized, authorized solutions to many problems. Because
innovation cr non-standard approaches are risky, there may
be "force-fitting" of solutions to problems and a narked
decrease in effectiveness, efficiency, or beta.
This process has been described in detail as tne
"garbage can model" of organizational behavior (Cohen and
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March, 1974) in which an organization is viewed as being
composed of four independent streams: problems, solutions,
participants, and choice opportunities. The decision process
consists of mixing the four in a garbage can and extracting
a combination of possible alternatives. In a Navy ccntext
the solutions are highly restricted by standard procedures,
the participants are limited, and the choice opportunities
are externally determined by senior level scheduling. Only
the problems are unlimited. A significant part of the
organization's problems originate in the mandate that no
task will be permitted to drop out of the lead. They have
all been accounted fcr in the planning processes, and they
must all be cone, including the new task.
The organization, or rather, the leaders have no
recourse at this point but tc expand the only resource ever
which they have any control--manhours. The dollars, the
numbers of people, and the time frame are all relatively
inflexible, but by expansion of the workday, the manhour
resource can be expanded within those constraints. The
result is increased dissatisfaction—dissatisf action
internally with the longer working hours and the perceived
lack of foresight by their leaders, and dissatisfaction
externally with the frustration of repeated attempts to plan
in an orderly fashion only to have to do it all over again
when a new commitment is dropped into the schedule. This
increased dissatisfaction is reflected in the decreasing
retention rates being experienced by the Navy. The extended
workday for the fleet units and the perception of management
as not being able tc see very far into the future are major





Perhaps the most widely accepted organizational model is
that developed by Leavitt (1965; Leavitt et. al., 1973). It
shows the organization as being composed cf people, task,













Figure 1 - LEAVITT'S ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL
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The particular value of this model is that it reflects the
dynamic way in which each element can affect and perhaps
even drive the actions of one or more of the ether elements.
For example, a unit which is critically undermanned may have
to reorganize its structure, to make more extensive use of
labor-saving technology while avoiding labor-intensive
machinery, and may have tc redefine its mission (task). A
major weakness of this model is that it is ccly an internal
view and is, therefore, simplistic and incomplete.
Accordingly, a picture of the environment must be
superimposed en the organization.
A complete and yet uncomplicated concept of the
environment is provided in the ecological model cf the
organization (Forbes, 1978). In this model the environment
is composed of five interactive forces: economic forces
(budgets, materials, and personnel resources) , human forces
(psychological, social, and political) , technical forces
(engineering, science, and information processing)
,
regulatory forces (legal, administrative, and moral), and
physical forces (geographical, climatic, and spatial




Figure 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL FORCES
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Ihe various forces in the environment can be hostile or
oenign, and the character and relative strength of the
hostility or friendliness can change rapidly. In considering
crisis management, the changes also occur unpredictabl y
.
This model of the organization and its environment, when
integrated, shows every element cf the organization as being
open to direct impact ty all of the environmental forces.
Although this is true to some extent in real-life
organizations, there is an insulating effect provided ty the
organization itself. The ecological model provides a buffer
between the organization and the direct influence of the
environment. In this model, time is viewed as a
semi-per meaole membrane through which the environmental
forces penetrate to one or more organizational elements for




Figure 3 - THE ECOLOGICAL MODEL
3U

Thus time becomes the critical factor in this mcdel in
that it is the determinant of the ability of the
organization to prepare for contact with the environment. If
the contact is to be hostile, such as an inspection t»ith
mission competence at stake (Propulsion Examining Eoari,
nuclear weapons, etc.), expansion of the time factor between
establishment of the event and its actual cccurance will
reduce the impact on the normal operations of the
organization. Mo-notice inspections (i . e., minimizing tne
buffer thickness at all points) are often proposed as a
means of insuring that high standards of readiness are
continually maintained by the fleet. It has also been
hypothesized that this would reduce the adverse
psychological effects of having a long-term threat hanging
over one's head. The merits or faults of these arguments
will not be addressed here, but it must be maintained that
such procedures would- contrioute greatly to tne
institutionalizing of crisis management and would
significantly reduce the predictability of tne
organization's already unstable environment.
If the contact with the environment is to be benign, as
for a pre-inspection assist visit, there is an apparent
paradox in that either expansion or contraction of the time
buffer between initiation and event will have beneficial
results. If the buffer is expanded, the organization again
has more time to prepare for the event and thus can maximize
the benefits to be gained by an assist visit evaluation. On
the other hand, decreasing the buffer will give the
organization the benefits (deficiency list to work on,
definition of needed assets, etc.) sooner and thus permit an
earlier start on corrective action. However, imposition of
an assist visit on too short a notice may so severely
disrupt the organization's schedule tnat crisis management
again results, and full benefit from tae visit is precluded.
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The criticality of the time dimension will be examined in
greater detail in a later section of this chapter.
DYNAMICS OF THE MCDSL
The normal operations of an organization can be viewed
as major commitments spaced evenly and sequentially en a
time continuum. In terms of this model, only one
environmental force will interact with the organization at
any one time, and that interaction will primarily involve
only one organizational element. The other organizational
elements will be affected by this interaction, of course,
because -of the close- linked nature of the elements. The key
to normal operations is the predictable and controlled rate
cf change of the buffer width. As a commitment approaches,
the insulating buffer between the organization and the
environment grows progressively thinner, and on the due date
the thickness at the impacting point is effectively zero.
Under crisis management, however, the orderly
functioning of the model deteriorates drastically.
Commitments of major significance occur in rapid succession
or simultaneously. By definition, many are cf a
short-notice, urgent nature. The spacing of the events on
the time continuum is no longer even or sequential. The rate
of change of the buffer thickness is neither predictable nor
controllable. Under conditions of simultaneous events, the
thickness of the buffer will be equal to zero at multiple
points. An additional effect is that the buffer is very thin
in areas where there is no direct contact because cf the
influence of pressing downstream events.
The result is a constructive disequilibrium between the
organization and the environment. When one element within
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the organization is primarily responsible for interacting
with the environment in more than one area, or, when the
different organizational elements are interacting with
different environmental forces, there is a breakdown of tne
communication and supportive links between the elements. The
lack of clearly defined priorities external to the
organization provides the basis for a similar lack of
priorities within the organization, and the efforts of the
unit become disjointed and ineffective. The different
elements may even be pulling in opposite directions. The
cohesive and unified nature of the organization breaks down
tc a greater or lesser extent depending on the significance
and degree of simultaneity of the commitments. Tne
organization is prohibited from addressing its problems in a
sequential manner (March and Simon, 1958; see Chapter II. B,
p. 13), and thus the organizational processes upon which the
unit relies for its existence begin to break down.
If the multiple contact points are sufficiently numerous
or become so closely spaced that the organization cannot
accomodate them all even with greatly expanded manhour
resources, the conceptual effect is that the environment
collapses in onto the organization and overwhelms it
entirely. This is the point where major schedule revisions
must occur, and it is typical for a great deal of outside
assistance to be provided to the organization to insure its
survival. That tne source of the accomodating schedule
changes and of the external assistance is the same source
which precipitated the organization's "crisis" in the first
place dees not appear to initiate a great deal of





Time has been presented as the critical factcr in
establishing the criteria for crisis management. This was
referred to earlier in this chapter as the dilemma of
planning which faces the modern Navy organization.
In analyzing this dilemma, the first element which
should be considered is the relationship of time to
information. The accuracy of the inf or matxcn which is needed
to take action is a function of the availability of time to
collect it (see Figure 4) . This is nothing mere than common
sense— the more time there is, the better the information
which can be collected. (Figure 4 shows the relationship as
linear. This has been done only to enhance tne simplicity of
the models; no assumptions about the actual shape of tne
curve have been or should be made.)
The factors affecting the relationship of time to
information include the complexity of the applicable data,
internal processing time, where the data are located, how
hard it is to locate and obtain, and the security
requirements over its handling and processing. It should be
acted that the model reflects the fact that there is always
some delay time between the initiation of information search
and the actual acquisition of the information. It also shows
that no matter how much time is availaole, all applicable
information 5££batl_y cannot be ODtained or processed. This
can be referred to as an "information gap". It has long been
recognized that decision- iraking must take place under
inf crma ticnal uncertainty, but tnat the uncertainty and the















Figure 4 INFORMATION-TIME RELATIONSHIP
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The second element contributing to the criticality of
time is the relationship of action to time. The ability to
act and the effectiveness of the action are functions cf the
time between initiation and the due date (see Figure 5).
This model reflects the normal inability of an organization
to take action the very instant that a commitment is
generated. However, it can freguently complete the
appropriate action before the due date by a marshalling of
its resources. This latter ability is the action curve's
potential "resource effect". Some action curves are
inflexible in that there is a certain amount of time
reguired to perform a task, no matter how extensive the
resources. (For example, "baking in" the PA tube on an air
search radar cannot be expedited with additional personnel.)
Other action curves are very flexible and will have a widely











r-iigure 5 ACTION-TIME RELATIONSHIP
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Action and information are, of course, intertwined and
mutually dependent. The initiation of action is highly
dependent en the availability of a minimum amount of
information (see Figure 6) . Again the icdel shows an
information gap. This is because all actions can usually be
completed without having all the information which exists in
the system. Past experiences and "good guessing" enable the














An integration of action and information with time as
the determinant produces a plane of potential effectiveness
upon which the organization operates (see Figure 7) . The
goal is to arrive at the commitment date with all actions
effectively completed. These actions are ideally based upon
complete information (in both volume and accuracy) collected
in the availaole time period. This model shows how the
delay tetween initiation of the commitment anc the
commencement of action is actually ccnspcsed of two
elements—the delay in actual acquisition of information
(see Figure 4) and the delay between that point and the
attainment cf the minimum information needed to take action
(see Figure 6). The model also includes early completion
from the resource effect (see Figure 5) and the typical











a - Information Acquisition Delay
b • Action Initiation Delay
c Resource Effect
d - Information Gap
o - r igi n
A- Plane of Potential Effectives
Figure 7 - PLANE OF POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENES;
1+5

An operational example of this process is provided by
the actions cf a ship scheduled for a aajor fleet exercise.
Although the ship may be aware of its participation fcr six
months or a year in advance, the intervening commitments and
the decreasing utility of dated information means that very
few preparations will be made that far in advance. As the
exercise date begins to approach, however, it becomes
imperative that the ship begin tc get ready (Item a, Figure
4, p. 39) . The search for information begins--ccgr.izant
officers in the hierarchy are identified; operation orders
and tasking messages are gathered. As these data are
digested, certain actions are identified for the ship (Item
a, Figure 6 , p. 43). Fuel, special ammunition and electronic
equipment are requisitioned, and stores are leaded. As the
underway date draws near, the minutae of the exercise and
mere detailed taskings emerge, and the preparations of the
ship escalate to high gear. Charts are laid out,
publications needed for tactical situations are pre-lccated
at the watchstat ions where they will be needed, special
training procedures are used to insure that the ship will be
at the aaximum readiness fcr its programmed involvement in
the exercise. Last minute repairs are made where needed. At
the appointed hour, the ship is underway with a trained
crew, fully operational engineering plant, ready weapons
systems, and a full lead of fuel and stores. If the ship is
designated to escort an aircraft carrier, however, her crew
may have little knowledge of the details cf an amphibious
operation taking place only a few miles distant (Item b,
Figure 6, p. 43) . Or if the ship is a replenishment ciler,
there may be little awareness of tne flight schedule of trie
carrier. Accordingly, it can be visualized that at the
commitment date, all appropriate actions were completed, but
there is still somewhat of an information deficiency.
As with the other models and concepts, the simplicity
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and predict eiility of this relationship falls apart under
crisis management. Under the conditions of multiple,
simultaneous commitments, the ability of the organization to
devote its attention to a task, to gather information, and
to take appropriate actions are split between the competing
goals (see Figure 8) . This complex model reflects the
divided attention which real-life organizations face under
crisis management conditions. In order for the organization
to address both goals, the resources to be used in taking
action and the inf or maticn-gathering efforts must be split
between the goals. As the due date for the simultaneous
events presses ever closer, the divisive fcrces become more
emphatic. The small square (Surface A, Figure 8) represents
the position of subcptimal equilibrium upon which the
organization will have a tendency to settle. While the
organization operates over this surface, the flow of
information and the actions taken with respect to bo^t_h goals
is balanced. In other words, under conditions of conflicting
goals, they have both been accomplished to the maximum
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But, as is obvious from the modal, when the due date is
reached, the organization still suffers from an information
deficiency ic both goal areas. In fact, the aggregate
information gap is far in excess of the gap under single
goal conditions. The adeguacies of the actions taken are
also less than optimum. (The diagram shows that the actions
are approximately fifty percent completed. This assumes a
linear, bi-directional axis and is used only for
illustration purposes. The scale would have tc oe
logarithmic for greater than fifty percent completion— such
an assumption would be guite credible in view of actual
fleet performances.) The model also reflects an aggregate
action delay effect from trying to do two things at once.
The result is that it tak.es longer to get started on either
goal than it normally would.
This model is a bit simplistic in that it reflects
simultaneous occurence and egual priorities. If the
priorities are slightly unegual but the accomplishment time
frames remain essentially overlapping, the splitting of
efforts to gather information and to take action will be
weighted by the leader's subjective evaluation of the risk
associated with the suboptimal accomplishment of each goal.
In ether words, tae higher priority goal or the one with the
greater cost of poor accomplishment will be completed" tc a
more satisfactory level than the one determined to te of
lesser importance to the organization (c. f.,
approach-approach conflict in social psychology, e. g.,
Erown, 1 957)
.
Within the conceptual framework provided by the
ecological model of the organization and its environment and
by the models of information and action interactions with
reference to time, the structure of the Navy as a
contributor to crisis management and the behavioral norms of
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Navy personnel will be examined.

IV. SUPEORTIVE ELEMENTS
A. ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
Crisis management is an organizational phenomenon. By
that it is meant that this operational mode is so widespread
in the Navy that it has become a standard operating
procedure. A partial understanding of how such a
dysfunctional process can be so extensive and yet tolerated
is obtained from the analysis of the structure of the Navy
itself.
The Navy is a classic hierarchical bureaucracy. The word
"bureaucracy" produces immediate negative and perhaps
unfortunate connotations. This is particularly true fcr the
military where the officers like to think, of themselves as
antithetical to the traditional "bureaucrat". k review of
the characteristics of bureaucracy (Weber, 1946), however,
indicates the relevance of this organizational definiticn to
the Navy:
(1) The sphere cf influence of each individual is
clearly defined.
(2) The authority associated with each office or
position in the organization is hierarchical, that is, every
office is subordinate to some higher office.
(3) The rules fcr operating the organization are
rational and intentional, and there is an orderly system of
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files established for maintenance of the organization's
history.
(4) Each individual receives thorough training for a new
ccsition before he assumes the job.
(5) There is obedience to the position or to rank., but
it is net related to the personal relationship with the
individual. Cne is not required to like or to associate with
a superior in other than a professional matter.
(6) Promotion is based on seniority within the
organization or on particularly noteworthy achievement. The
superiors judge the qualifications of the individual for
advancement and increased responsibility within the
organization
.
(7) Individual behavior and discipline are based en the
position held within the organization and net on ownership
of a part of the operations.
The management system in the bureaucratic organization
is equally structured (Burns, 1963):




(2) There is an extensive use of advanced technology to
improve the processes within the organization. As the means
are developed, however, there is a marked tendency tc ignore
tne ends cf the concern. This is frequently referred tc as a
"means-ends inversion".
(3) Success within the organization is highly dependent
on recognition of an individual's tasks by his superiors.
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(4) Both the rights and the obligations of the
individual and of the organization are precisely defined.
(5) fiespcnsibilities within the organization are applied
to the various functional positions and not to the
individuals themselves.
(6) Control, authority, and communication are
hierarchical. This means that information and power are
passed vertically, and there is usually no mechanism for the
lateral transfer of either one.
(7) The knowledge of the real nature of situations
(having the "big picture"), the reconciliation of task
assignments and information mismatches, and the assessment
of relevance to both task, and information is exclusively a
function of top management. The higher in the hierarchy, the
greater the knowledge and the greater the relevance of the
various inputs to that level.
(8) Because of the vertical power and inforaation
passing, anc because of the superiority of knowledge
possessed by the upper levels, nearly all interactions will
be vertical. This insures that one of the parties will have
more of the valuable commodities of power cr information to
share with the subordinate. Lateral interactions have a
reduced benefit as well as a reduced visibility factor.
(9) The operations of the organization subunits and the
behaviors of the individuals within them are governed fairly
rigidly by the superiors.
(10) Membersnip in the organization is conditional upon
obedience to the superior and lcyalty to the organization.
(11) There is more importance attached tc lccal
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knowledge than to general knowledge. Ihis breeds an
organization composed of highly specialized "resident
experts" with only the highest levels aware cf or interested
in the overall strategy of the organization.
The institution of bureaucracy in America began to
flourish in the late 1800*s as the industrial world became
able to support larger and larger organizations to
accomplish the multiplying tasks facing it. Although the
scientific and manufacturing worlds were undergoing rapid
and rather drastic changes, the great social movements had
not yet begun, nor had technological progress found its way
into the everyday lives of the common man. Exploitation of
the masses was tolerated, and the government had not yet
begun to exert its regulatory might. Tnus the environment
was relatively calm, and bureaucracy was able to develop
unmolested or challenged by ether organizational forms.
This adaption of bureaucracy to a benign environment is well
recognized.
"Bureaucracy thrives in a highly competitive,
undifferentiated and stable environment, such as the
climate of its youth, the Industrial Revolution. A
pyramidal structure of authority, with power
concentrated in the hands cf a few with the knowledge
and resources to control an entire enterprise was,
and is, an emminently suitable social arrangement for
routinized tasks." (Bennis, 1965, p. 73) .
Or, more simply:
"A mechanistic management system is appropriate tc
stable conditions." (Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.
119) .
In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of
bureaucratic organizations, one must recognize that there
are several distinct advantages to this organizational form.
One category has come to be called the technical advantages
of bureaucracy ("Weber, 1946) . These are precision, speed,
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unambiguity , continuity, and the reduction cf material and
personnel costs. Other advantages, which would be called
non-technical, are the predictability of the bureaucratic
organizational response under various conditions, the
criteria for success have been defined and can usually be
fcund in writing, and the existence of a widespread, highly
refined "corporate knowledge" which usually resides in the
informal organization.
These advantages, however, may not ts sufficient to
enable the bureaucratic organization to operate effectively
in today's world. By reviewing briefly the current nature of
the environmental forces which impact on the organization
(technical, human, regulatory, economic, and physical), it
can be determined that the environment is, in fact, far from
the stability to which bureaucracy is adapted.
(1) Technical forces. There is nearly an exponential
growth in these factors in recent years. The advances are so
rapid that the ability to produce state-of-the-art weapons
and sensors lags well behind discoveries. The sheer mass of
scientific and and technological informaticn that has to be
digested by today's officer is staggering, yet his very
survival may depend on it. In terms of the information-time
relationship model (see Figure 4, p. 39) , the information
search is greatly complicated and made much more
time-consuming. This of course impacts on the ability of the
unit to act en the information.
(2) Human forces. There are many social variations which
impact upon the organization. Seme of these within the Navy
are the non-economic matters that are becoming increasingly
important to the individual, the shift in behavior related
to the increased importance of individual values in the
place of organizational values, and the miniscule changes in
managerial techniques over the decades which causes
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increased organizational dissatisfaction (Bowers, 1975).
(3) Regulatory forces. These are continually changing
and increasing, both from within and from outside the Navy.
The significance of this factor was repeatedly pointed out
by the respondents to CDR Mumford's article (Proceedings,
August, 1977). Three factors wnich were considered as
overwhelming by Navy unit commanders were the extensive
follow-up reporting that was required of them, the add-on
instructions which showered upon them and which so confused
the issue that required actions were ofter contradictory,
and a feeling of emphasis en the procedures and a
discrediting of the effectiveness cf the results. In
addition, congressional actions are increasingly influencing
the management of the Navy and other military forces, and
the threat of unionization promises to increase 'chz
regulatory forces substantially.
(4) Zconcmic forces. Cuts in military budgets, the
increasing share of the budget which must gc to support the
personnel areas, decreasing material reliabilxty ail
contribute to the constant state of fiscal fluctuation which
must be faced. Additionally, there is an impact from the
regular ccst-of-li ving pay raises which do not match those
of the civil service or the current rate of inflation: anger
and growing dissatisfaction among military personnel.
(5) Physical forces. Bi-annual moves (frequently
cross-country), the regular deployments, crowding aboard
ships with outdated facilities (not restricted to the fleet,
however, since many of the shore facilities are operating
cut of pre-Wcrld War II buildings) , and the heat or cold and
noise associated with shipboard life make these factors
quite unsettling.
In the above brief analysis of the Navy's environment,
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it is quite evident that that anvironeat cannot be
classified as stable. The conditions are further complicated
by the fluctuating world tensions and corresponding Navy
commitments which are an integral part of any military
organization's existence. The disadvantages of the
bureaucratic structure become even more severe when the
organization is enmeshed inextricanly in an unstable
environment. A review of seme of these disadvantages is in
order
.
A common bureaucratic tendency when faced with
instability is a firm reliance on the toundaries of
responsibility (Burns, 1963). This is marked by the passing
of problems to a point in the organization where
responsibility is known and accepted, or, barring that,
passing the problems to a superior for resolution. The
result is nearly always an overloading cf the superiors.
Tney are required uy the organization to be involved with
most decisions and are responsible for almost all
coordination. The appropriate level for the decisions cr for
the coordination may be several levels belcw that at which
the action is finally taken. Such overloading of the
superior creates multiple goal conflicts on an individual
vice on an organizational level. The model developed in
Chapter III (see Figure 8, p. 48) applies here also, and
there is a strong tendency for suboptimal accomplishment of
the simultaneous requirements.
A second tendency for the bureaucracy is to continue to
differentiate in order to meet the needs of the environment
as it continually changes. As new needs are generated by the
environment, the organization creates a new specialist to
handle it. This may involve the creation of whole new groups
cr staffs within the hierarchy. And, as the specialists
multiply, the organization finds that the various elements
are no longer or are marginally capable cf communicating
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with each other, so internal interpreters and intermediaries
are created for the purpose of "liason" (Burns and Stalker,
1961) . Of course, as stated previously, the responsibility
for the relevance of all of this lies with the superior, but
it will probably De accepted as a natural outgrowth of his
coordination and decision-making duties.
Accompanying the differentiation of the organization and
the retreating behind boundaries of job definition is a
reduction in organizational lateral communications, an
element which is already not a strong point in the
bureaucracy. Some of the slack may be picked up by the
intermediaries, but unless they receive specific tasking -co
do so, they usually will not take on this added
responsibility. It must be recognized that there is value
associated with information: he who has it is accorded
greater status and is less dispensaole to the organization
than one who does not have information. As with any valuable
and rare commodity, there is a tendency to hoard this
information and to share only as much as is neccessary to
get by. Accordingly, information-guarding is another element
among the causes of poor lateral communications.
Information-guarding also severely affects the availability
of that information to those parts of the organization which
need it to act. Thus the information acquisition delay can
be greatly expanded ( see Figure 4, p. 39). A final
contributory factor is the responsibility cf the individual
to the superior, with only weak responsibility ties tc tne
organization. Although the informal organization does exert
some influence on the individual to share his information,
the survival of the individual within the organization rests
with his superior, not with his peers. Therefore, the
crganizaticnal forces supporting lateral communications are
weak at best.
Still another tendency of bureaucracies in tne
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environment, of change is evidenced by the decision-making
habits cf the leaders. Because of their limited exposure to
the many refined decision models and management techniques
being developed today (some of which are listed below in
Chapter V), there is a marked tendency for bureaucratic
managers to categori2e both their decision-making aics and
tne problems which they face (see "Sepertcries" , Chapter
II. E, p. 14; March and Simon, 1958). In most cases they do
match the categories somewhat so that the selected solution
is in the same general area as the problem, but the exact
fit may not be right. This also results in a much reduced
search for new and better alternative solutions (Merton,
1940) .
The individuals within the bureaucracy are subjected to
numerous forces which produce a dispersion of their
commitment. By virtue of their membership in the
organization, they are required to be committed tc the
organization itself. But this is diluted by the
individual's commitment to his superior (both in the form of
hero-worship and in the form of having to support the
superior in crder to survive), by a commitment to himself
(especially if his self-image is one of the "comer" in the
organization) , by a commitment to his work group as an
ascendant system within the organization, and finally by a
commitment to the informal organization because it meets his
social and psychological needs. The end result of this
dispersion of commitment is that the organization receives
the pauper's share of the individual's concerns.
The final disadvantageous tendency of bureaucracy which
as to be considered is the political maneuvering which goes
on in the organization. This is operant at several levels.
The first is the internal system-vs. -system level. Here the
established subgroups in the bureaucracy unite to reject t ae
newer groups and insure that they (the original ones) will
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In this passage we find alsc the paradox of the individuals
using their "concern for the job" as a front for
self-serving behavior which may be dysfunctional from the
organization • s perspective.
Political maneuvering also takes place at the individual
level. This tray be rather subtle, but it can be recognized
as an outgrowth of the regulations and increased rigidity of
behavior of the irdividuals as they rely on the limits of
their responsibilities. The de f ensibility of the
individual's behavior is greatly increased (March and Simon,
1958) , even when his legitimate refusal to act causes
widespread problems elsewhere. The recent examples of
organizational distress caused by employees utilizing
"working to the rule" as a coercive technique indicate the
potential danger to large organizations. A proliferation of
"book men" is a symptom of organizations which are
proceeding down this somewhat dangerous path.
This individual rigidity and political oehavior becomes
a self-sustaining force as pointed out below:
".
. . The reduction in personalized relationships
facilitates the development of an esprit de
corps, i. e., increases the extent to which goals are
perceived as shared among members of the group. Such
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a sense of commonness of purpose, interests and
character increases the propensity of organization
members to defend each other against outside
pressures. This, in turn, solidifies the tendency
toward rigid behavior." (March and Simon, 1953, p.
39) .
In other wcrds, any outside pressures will unify the
organization in its political maneuvering to defend itself
against the perceived threat. At the same time, the
individuals will be driven even deeper intc their reliance
on the strict boundaries of their responsibilities and
further reduce the internal cooperation necessary for the
organization's survival under unstable environmental
conditions.
The abcve brief description of some of the
characteristics of the bureaucratic structure of the Navy
will permit an examination of the relationships between that
structure and crisis management.
The first characteristic of bureaucratic organizations
which is related to crisis management is the tendency cf the
organization to expand its differentiation in order to
respond to uncertainty and new challenges. This creates a
cadre of "resident experts" who can deal with external and
internal requirements guite efficiently, but the management
of a multitude of specialists is extremely demanding of the
superior (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The following symptoms
appear in a large, differentiating bureaucracy: •
—The management of diversified specialists demands a
generalise if the organization is to be coordinated and
monitored adeguately. Such generalists cannot be obtained
from within an organization which is producing senior
specialists. If an attempt is made to introduce the
generalise from an outside organization, the credibility and
experiences cf the "intruder" will not permit him to
function effectively as the manager. The least dysfunctional
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path is tc promote the most competent specialist.
--The actions of the specialist subgroups tend to be
redundant and uncoordinated. Subordinate individuals and
organizations become burdened with duplicative or
conflicting demands. The senior levels are overloaded by
requirements to resolve the conflicts, and they are usually
unable to provide additional resources to remedy the
problem. The leaders as well as the subordinates become
trapped in a routine of suboptimal goal accomplishment.
--Lateral communications between the differentiated
elements is weak cr non-existent. Attempts at integration
are simplistic and frequently fail because there was no
prior establishment of common spheres of influence (or
clustering of similar accountable paths) .
--A corollary to the redundant requirements is an
inadequate or non-existant prioritization system. When the
unit is forced to prioritize based on what it considers to
be an appropriate weighting scheme (as previously mentioned,
this is often a function of the seniority cr the power of
the originating source) , the time and resource allocation
becomes a risky business with the price of a wrong guess
being fairly high.
--Tne requirements for follow-up are frequently
nebulous. The same argument applies to justification fcr the
continued existence of the subgroups. In ether words, if a
new program cr a reporting requirement is initiated, it is
very unusual for that program or report sponsor to have to
defend its existence on a recurring basis. Even more unusual
is for such a program or report to have a "self-destruct"
date after which it simply no longer exists. The
perpetuation of outdated requirements becomes highly likely,
and the probability of these programs and reports actually
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being in consonance with the organization's goals is
diminished. Certain communities have realized this tendency
and have introduced the new concept of "sunset laws", i. e.,
those which must be repeatedly reapproved by public
referendum if they are to remain in effect. This is a
relatively recent and not very widespread technique for
insuring the current nature of the regulatory forces in the
society. Unfortunately, should such a destruct date be
included with a new requirement, the subgroup in charge of
it frequently becomes so involved in defending its own
continued existence that the perspective of the
organizational goals is soon lost.
--The location within the organization cf the "resident
experts" which the system generates is hard to locate and is
often unspecified. This greatly increases the time expended
to obtain that information which is needed to begin action,
and the crisis management issue is further complicated.
Associated with this is the inability or unwillingness of
the "expert" to take responsibility for his actions or to be
quoted as a source of information. This means that more time
will pass before a supervisor can be advised of tne
situation so he can make a decision. And, of course, if
authorization for the unit to act must be obtained, this
will fall into the same time-delay pattern.
A second characteristic of bureaucratic organizations
which relates to crisis managemert is the proliferation of
rules and regulations. This is a function of the
bureaucracy's continued specialization and differentiation
in that standard procedures are established to fill the
vacuum created by the poor lateral communications. These
rules and regulations define the extent and the nature of
the coordinating relationships within the organization, but
they dc net insure its effectiveness, nor do they account




These proliferating rules and regulations have tended of
late to specify in increasing detail the level of
accomplishment which is expected of the units (a minimum
percentage of weekly maintenance actions which must be
accomplished, the minimum score which is acceptable en an
inspection, etc.). By such specification, it is increasingly
possible that the units will oe violating the Fareto
principle in their task accomplishment (Mackenzie, 1972).
This principle states that the first eighty percent of a job
is completed in the first twenty percent of the time
expended on it. The remaining eighty percent of the time is
spent trying, occasionally futilely, to complete the final
twenty percent of the job. In a personal message to ail
commanding officers of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas 3.
Hayward (CINCPACFLT) recognized this when he warned them to
use good judgement when approacning the "flat part of the
effectiveness curve". It is probable that the cumulative
effect of multiple tasks with specified minimum (but high)
levels of accomplishment may be overwhelming to the unit. It
is the function of the senior level to insure tnat this does
net happen, but the overloading at that level preempts the
attention time required to remedy this situation.
Associated with the formalization of the procedures in
the bureaucratic organization and supported by the
essentially vertical communication pattern is the multiple
filtering effect on the information which is passed through
the system.
"The hierarchy . . . operates as an information
filter upward, with each level of the hierarchy only
passing up to the next such information as is
considered relevant .... Similarly, on the
downward flow of instructions, the higher the level,




A characteristic of this information and regulatory flow
is that the leaders at the lower operational levels can
suffer from exactly the same type of informational overload
as that experienced by the higher levels. The nature cf the
information may be qualitatively very different, but it may
be quite similar quantitatively. This is complicated in the
Navy by the pressing need for currency in the officer's
primary warfare skills, his ability to keep abreast of world
events and the ever-improving intelligence outputs, and so
forth. Ine final product is the same: too much correct
information. This is identical to the war environment
problem noted by Babad and Solomon (see Chapter II. E, p. 13)
and is a question of relevancy. The apparent paradox of
every level within the organization having too much
information and too much direction to do an adequate job may
be the challenge of the eighties whicn faces the Navy.
There is another dynamic which results from the
burgeoning rules and regulations in the bureaucracy. This is
an establishment of responsibility at a lower level without
a concurrent delegation of authority. The insidious nature
of this reversal of the "principle of parity of authority
and responsibility" (Koontz and O'Donneil, 1968) needs to be
recognized. The commanding officer of a ship is totally
responsible for maintaining the combat effectiveness cf his
ship and crew, yet he cannot get that ship underway for
training without the permission of several successively
senior staffs and commanders. A tactical fighter squadron
may desperately need to practice carrier approaches and
maneuvers, but if the aircraft carrier is not underway
because cf a fuel shortage, then the pilots go wanting.
Unfortunately, instructions which specify that the
"Commanding Officer shall ..." often do not provide the
means for the Commanding Officer to do anything.
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A third characteristic of bureaucratic organizations
which encourages crisis management, is the structural
rigidity which is its essence. A part of this is perceptual
vice actual, hut that can have just as great an influence on
organizational dynamics as tangible factors. It must be
acknowledged that rigid structures are somewhat discordant

































































































































































This lack of consonance with the "contemporary realities" of
Bennis produces dissatisfactions with the nature of the
organization itself. The individual may identify with tne
goals of the organization, but he finds the means of
accomplishing them intolerable. There are two primary


































































































































These structural-social contradictions and the
concordant dissatisfactions are well recognized by Navy
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commanders, but the regulatory restrictions on their
behavior essentially precludes a capability to do anything
about them. These commanders, too, are frustrated by the
incongruence, but they are facing the burden of the mission
and the unit's commitments. This is often the source cf the
complaints that "the captain only cares about the job, not
the people". In this battle of perspective mismatches, a
short-fused additional commitment can beccne an example of
this perceived lack of care for the humans in the
organization. The commanding officer is the closest visible
representative of the "system", so the individual's
hostility becomes transferred to the organization as a
whole, and the dissatisfactions are further increased. The
end result cf this long and involved perceptual chain based
on the structural rigidity of the organization is that
"crisis management" becomes amplified and distorted cut of
proportion to its actual impact. But it is the translation
of this perceptual distortion into individual behaviors with
which the commanding officer must deal. The complexity of
managing these behaviors and attitudes while attempting to
address a "crisis" commitment can be extremely taxing tc the
commander, especially in light of the reduced time which is
available tc him. This latter factor frequently precludes
airing the situation and eliminating the unwarranted
suspicions in order to get the job done with a unified
front. *
Among the many conclusions in his report on Navy
manpower, Bowers (1975) included the following which support
the above relationships:
--The Navy currently has serious probleis in the areas
cf organizational climate and leadership behaviors. These
are far below their civilian counterparts, and they are much





--There is a distinct perceived lack of personal
independence in the Navy resulting from the bureaucratic
structure and from unnecessary intrusion into the lives of
the individuals.
— In the attempt to better operate the mission elements
and units, the Navy has frequently substituted hardware for
human competence. This lack of competence is particularly
noted in the management areas.
—The individuals in the Navy, just like the civilians
in their organizations, have high needs fcr participative
treatment.
—Ships and shore stations are socio- technical systems.
loo often they have been treated as technical systems alone.
Consequently, the traininq and the experience and the
concept of dealing with an organization as a social system
is relatively poor among Navy leaders.
—There is a definite need to decentralize the Navy
organization and flatten the structure. Tnis will promote
rewarding independence, lateral communications and
cooperation, and it will decrease the dominance cf the
immediate superior in every move of the subordinate units.
This discord between the Navy organization and the
people within it has been recognized at many levels. The
Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral James D. Watkins, in
an interview with The Washington Post, stated, "The Navy was
net prepared for the more qualified, more competent, more
mature, more inquisitive, and more demanding young people
who started coming into the service in large numbers in
1972" (Washington Post Service, November 16, 1977).* Changing
the organization and making it more challenging and
rewarding for the individuals within it is an extremely
68

complicated and lengthy process, especially in the face of
the inherent inertia in a bureaucracy as large as the Navy.
No one would encourage hasty and possioly regrettable
change, but the indications are clear that the present
conditions cannot be long tolerated.*
A final characteristic of bureaucratic organizations
which will be treated here is the tendency of tenured
individuals (i. e. , those with many years of experience
within the organization) to retreat into the security cf the
institution and its traditions when confronted with the
nature and the magnitude of the organizational problems
which revolve about the structure. This is guite similar to
the way in which the lower levels of the hierarchy retreat
behind the defined boundaries of their job positions. The
result is also usually very similar to that at the lcwer
levels, cne cf actually magnifying the problem instead of
resolving it. The norm is defensive justification cf the
organization and its actions; receptive examination of the
criticism in a problem-solving atmosphere is atypical. An
interesting case study in the way in which institutional
behavior in a bureaucracy can magnify or create a problem is
provided by an investigation into "crisis management"
conducted by CINCPACPLT which coimencad in October 1976.
CINCPACFLT's original message requested inputs from the
various type commanders concerning "avoidable crisis
management". At the next level, however, this unusual but
not extraordinary request was elevated to crisis proportions
for the surface forces.' CCMN A VSURF? AC requested inputs,
consolidated first by the intermediate Squadron commanders
and then by the superior Group commanders. This rather
routine request for information through traditional channels
initiated a frantic effort at the individual unit level.
Thxs was because the tasking message, of routine precedence
and sent on the 23rd of October, required that the collated
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responses be received by COHNAVSU&FP AC ty the fifth of
November. There were no formatting instructions, and
guidelines as to specificity of content and d esireability of
examples were equally vague. Jiany units and the
intermediate commanders spent remarkaole quantities of their
leadership manhcurs during this brief pericd of time in
attempting to determine just what was desired, who was in
charge of this project, and how to answer the questions in a
sufficiently de-politicized manner that it would not cone
back to haunt them. In terms of the models presented in
Chapter III, the information acquisition delay was greatly
expanded because the "rules of the game" were unknown. The
larger staffs, especially the type commander's, created
special internal "task forces" to gather the flood of
incoming messages and to handle the "crisis management"
crisis en crash casis (recall the tendency
bureaucracy to differentiate and specialize in order tc meet
new challenges). The reports and follow-up actions continued
for almost a year. Interestingly enough, the end of all of
this was not yet in sight when a new and even more visible
(and political) issue started the cycle all over. This was
the publication of CDR Mumford's article in the llaval
Institute Proceedinqs in September 1977. In one way this
cycle was a tit easier for the staffs than the previous
crisis because the task forces were already in existence and
were familiar with their patterns of communication and
infermatien sources. But the issues were related, and the
disturbances to the organization were ^uite similar.
There were some actions taken in response to these
flare-ups of interest in the subject of crisis management,
but the adequacy and the appropriateness of tnese actions
are subject tc question. The analysis of the replies was
based on a simple percentage weighting of the cateccries
into which the symptoms could be relegated. There was no
provision for a more sophisticated importance weighting
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system tc be included or utilized because cf the lack of
formatting and the cpen-ended responses. There was no
independent appraisal of the situation in the fleet pricr to
the request cr after the study area had been contaminated by
the messages. During this time one attempt tc scientifically
investigate crisis management and the factors which appeared
to reduce its impact in some units was in ths design phase
at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San
Diego. Unfortunately, the project's funding has recently
been terminated. Likewise, an independent appraisal cf the
effectiveness of the actions taken to date has net teen
conducted. some reduction in the dominance of short-fuzed
requirements has oeen realized at the fleet level, but
commanding officers are still heard to complain about the
overburdening and about the degree of flexibility demanded
of them.
Problems such as schedule instability, excessive
inspections, administrative burdens, short-fuzed
requirements, and inadequate resources may be only the
symptoms of more significant organizational ills. Until tae
structure of the Navy comes under critical review and
changes are made, we will continue to treat the symptoms
while the disease gees on unchecked. Representative cf this,
our current approaches to retention appear to be emphasizing
quotas instead of addressing the ways in which the
organization can make Navy life more rewarding, challenging,
and congruent with the changing values of the individuals.
In this vein, the reduction in the manpower and services of
the Human Resource Management Centers, and a perceived
reduction in the influence of the Human Resource Subsystem
in the Navy may be an even further step in the continued
institutionalization of crisis management in tne
organization
.
An additional and interesting sidelight tc tne
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investigations into crisis management and the Mum ford
article arises cut of the information-guarding tendencies of
the bureaucratic organization. Ail messages and
correspondence were by means of "personals". This means
extremely limited distribution of the contents, and,
accordingly, the persons actually gathering the information
were often unaware the reasons for their sometimes
outlandish actions. It also meant that the actions taken to
alleviate the situation were not publicized. One is led to
conjecture that the individuals within the units were aware
of the "flail" that was taking place because of the
expenditure cf manhours at the senior levels and the trouble
of maintaining confidentiality within typing or
message- processing centers. But one would also conjecture
that the lack of publicity would cause additional unrest
among those members and that the "grapevine" would be
rampant with misinformation. The end result would mean more
trounle for the units than if the situation were handled in
the open, and it is also possible that the latter treatment
might have produced listings of correctible issues that were
more than superficial symptoms.
E. NAVY SOCIOLOGICAL NORMS
Probably the most dominant behavioral ncrm whicn drives
military officers, especially at the more senior levels, is
based upon the neccessity for maintaining a rapid response
capability. It is, in fact, the raison d'etre of the
military. This was succinctly stated by CINCPACFLT in a
personal message to all commanding officers:
".
. . the hallmark of our Navy resides in its
ability to respond promptly to real crises, and that
mobility and flexible operations are properly our
bread and butter. Our Navy is, and must be, a crisis
oriented organization, whose principal command
structure is cased upon the time-tested, successful
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principles of delegation of authority, clear chain of
command, narrow span of control, and acceptance of
responsibility." (ALEACFLT 01-77).
lhis awareness of the need for speedy response is permitted
to carry ever into the daily management of the Navy where it
may be totally out of place. As has been pointed out
(Drucker, 1967), it is far more important to make an
accurate and adequate response than to make a speedy cne.
One reason for the emphasis on speed is because the crisis
response is much more enjoyable for the "hard-charging"
naval officer. Under these circumstances he can see
immediate progress towards solving his most pressing
problems. Such progress, even if it is not en the track to
solving the problem in the- most efficient and effective
manner, is quite rewarding for the officer, so he keeps
"stirring the pot". It can also be hypothesized that the
energy of the Navy leadership which was directed outwards on
the enemy during the many years of Vietnam is now being
devoted internally to the Navy as a whole. Accordingly, the
crisis mode, so appropriate to a wartime environment and so
successful to these officers in the formative years of their
careers, is now being applied systematically to solving the
problems of the peacetime, rapidly changing Navy. Such
"repertories" of activities are not appropriate tc the
alteration of a social system as large as the Navy, and they
are totally cut of context with the values of the young
sailors and officers entering the service.
A second norm of Navy behavior is that of obedience,
lhis is, of course, essential to the functioning of any
organization, especially a military one. The degree of
authoritarian obedience expected and demanded of Navy
personnel is rather extraordinary, however. The standard is
calm acceptance of the directives of seniors. This would be
wholly justified if the higher levels in the bureaucracy did
in fact have more and better information and so were correct
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in their demands. Here the withholding of information which
characterizes the organization becomes the foundation for
the perpetuation of the crisis mode. The higher echelons
may have more information, but, because of the
information-guarding tendencies in the bureaucracy, the
aggregate accuracy is guestionable. Not also that the
unchecked assumptions about seniors and subordinates which
were pointed out by Babad and Solomon (see Chapter II. E, p.
18) are operant in this case. Even if the tasking is
questioned, the risks to the commander are very high if he
voices his unease. The strongest response which he may be
willing to make is to submit a report summarizing the total
commitment package which the unit is facing and advising the
boss just hew tough things are (while tne unit complies with
the demands in toto) . The foregoing should not be construed
as encouraging insubordination or mutiny. It is rather an
exhortation to negotiate the overall loading of a unit when
the burden becomes excessive. This will involve some risk
on the part of the commanding officer, and it will
neccessitate an acceptance of this climate by the seniors in
the chains of command. As one commanding officer stated in
his response to the Mumford article, ". . . we should
continue to afford our seniors the oenefit of our opinions
whether they want them or not and continue to work for
change within the system as our conscience dictates".
A third behavioral norm which affects the Navy is that
associated with the "can do" spirit. This is related to the
norms of obedience, but it is a bit mere complicated. This
can-do spirit is associated with the "finest traditions of
the Navy", vocabulary which is sure to stir the blood of
blue-water sailors, but which often refers to useless or
dysfunctional anachronisms. An example of this type of
thinking is provided by the response of another commanding
officer to the same article by CDR Mumford: "Of course I
haven't had everything my way. But I doubt that John Paul
74

Jones did either." By questioning the can-do spirit of an
individual or of an organization, one can imply failure or
can challenge competency by extracting confessions of being
overburdened. This challenge to competency is a threefold
one. First, it challenges the competency cf the leader or
the commanding officer himself. He is the manager cf a
complex socio-technical system, but he is the beneficiary of
only a minimum of managerial tools. Experience alone may not
suffice to carry the unit through the many trials which it
will face, but the self-confidence of the commanders and
their can-do spirit will keep them in the game. The second
challenge is to the competency of the unit. The leader is
surrounded and perhaps overwhelmed by the bureaucracy, but
he can provide no reasonable alternatives. If he is able to
cffer any respite to the systemic pressures, it will of
necessity be internal to his own organization. Therefore, it
will be on a relatively minor scale, and it will probarly be
ineffective. But by his can-do spirit, the commanding
officer will insure that his organization survives in a Navy
which is ever increasing in complexity. The end result is
nearly always a reversion to task-oriented leadership. The
third challenge is to the competency of the Navy as a whole.
This results in a highly defensive posture cf accepting the
Navy as "the best of all possible worlds". Implications of
"my Navy" as being pocrly managed or with ill-defined goals
will stimulate the nationalistic forces in the individual
(Katz, 1965; see Chapter II. B, p. 17).
The can-do spirit is, unfortunately, relied upon in the
tasking of the operational units. It is known that
subordinates will "rise to the challenge" as they always
have done in the past. The reason that this is unfortunate
is that it entails ever increasing costs because the younger
officers and sailors are not willing tc accept such a
punishing standard of behavicr indefinitely. Ihis places the
commanding officer in the position of mediator in a tattle
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of attitudes, something for which
particularly well prepared.
he has not been
The can-do spirit also has an implication that certain
types of officers will undertake voluntary overloads for
their units in order to appear as the "shining star" in the
boss's otherwise dark sky. He feels that his 'embodim snt of
this traditional value will instill a superior level of
confidence in him by the senior levels, and his future will
thus be enhanced. This type of officer is fast becoming
extinct because the "routine" burdens on the various units
in the Navy are more than can reasonably be expected. Just
getting it all done is enough to gain stardom.
A fourth norm of behavior is one which is highly related
to the structure of the Navy. This nas been referred to as
bureaucratic behavior (Argyris, 1967), and it has several
•component parts. The first element in the bureaucratic
behavior norm is that of competition between the
individuals. As has often been observed, the Navy's
evaluation system with its forced ranking tends to insure
the dominance of competitive behavior. Seme competition is
desireable, tut when it progresses to the pcint where there
is win-lose maneuvering, then it becomes extremely
dysfunctional and must be reduced. This element is further
complicated by the relatively short tours for military
officers, thus reducing the time which is available tc the
officer during which he must prove himself tc his superiors.
This can, and often does, produce an enhancement of any
polarization effects so that tie individual can insure his
visibility and ascendancy in the organization. As noted by
Eabad and Sclomon (see Chapter II. B, p. 13), the case is
often overstated to bring about just this effect.
A second element in bureaucratic behavior is dependence
en the superior. This is a result of the superior being the
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source of resolution of polarizations and conflicts, and the
superior aust set or rearrange the priorities of the
subordinates where the risk, is too high for the subordinate
to accept the responsibility for such actions. Of course, if
the subordinate admits his difficulty with the priorities or
the conflict, he is taking another type of risk, that which
is associated with his can-do spirit and competence. This
nay become a stressful "Catch-22" for the commanding
officer. But the commander must communicate with the
superior in order to find out what the latter's desires are,
and this contributes to his dependence also. Recall that in
the bureaucracy all outputs must be tailored to fit the
desires of the superior, since that is the prerogative of
his position of increased power and information (see Chapter
IV. A, p. 50-52) .
k third element to bureaucratic oehavior runs somewhat
counter to the visibility tendencies cf the competitive
element, and that is the tendency towards conformity. This
element reduces the risk associated with standing cut from
the crowd. It is a function of individual survival vice that
cf organizational benefits which may accrue to the star. Tne
seeking of the scarce rewards can be a precarious search,
and the individual and organizational costs can be high. 3y
remaining a fart of the pack, a relatively safe position is
established because of the extensive precedent which is
being set by the entire group of peers.
There are several other elements to Argyris* concept of
bureaucratic oehavior. The identification with
organizational successes and the avoidance cf any blame or
association with failures is a key component. Even if
valuaole lessons learned can preclude wasted time and effort
by the fleet in the future, commanding officers are loath to
"put themselves on report" and thus become a potential
sacrificial lamb. Bureaucratic behavior is also marked by a
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lew interpersonal competence en the part cf the leaders.
They are not used to receiving feedbacK in a straightforward
manner from either superior or from subordinate since it has
rarely oeen done. The leaders tend to be emotionally
restrained, since emotionality is viewed as a weakness among
"professional naval officers". Bureaucratic leaders also
tend to have a very low tolerance for ambiguity. This is
especially prevalent among military officers where
everything tends to be spelled out in very fine detail.
A last element of bureaucratic behavior is the tolerance
for the weaknesses of the organization which arises after
years of association with the organization. This is a result
of constructive ownership, i. e. , no actual financial
ownership but an adoption of the organization's values as
one's own because of the lengthy association. This tolerance
tends to produce somewhat rigid behavior on the part of tne
leaders. This rigidity becomes most evident when actions of
individuals or proposals for the organization transgress tne
limits of the "traditional" values with which the leaders
are most comfortable. The size of the bureaucratic
organization and the tolerance of its values by the leaders
produces a less innovative system, as stated below:
".
. . the greater the diversity of the organization
(in either its incentive system or its task structure
or both)
,
the jlEjater the liKeiihccd that some
member will conceive " major innovations, the
greater the IIKeliHood tnat some members will
propose innovations, and the less likelihood that
the organization will adopT the innovations."
(Wilson, 1966, p . 245) .
Eecause cf the lessened innovation and the tolerance cf the
system's irritations, the decisions which are made tend to
be below their potential for effectiveness. And, when
subordinates are working under such a system of tolerance
which they view as dysfunctional, their internal coumi tment
to the organization is reduced.
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In his studies of the leadership of large organizations,
Argyris (1967) has also addressed the issues of the
relations between the supervisors and the subordinates. He
has found that
"
. . . executives tend to hold three basic values
about effective human reiationsnips within
organizations. They are:
1. Get the job done. . . .
2. Be rational and logical and communicate clearly.
Effectiveness decreases as behavior becomes more
emotional. ...
3. People work best under carefully defined
direction, authority and control. governed by
appropriate rewards and penalties that emphasize
rational tehavior and achievement of the objective."
(p. 192).
Although these statements are typical of most large
organizations in both military and civilian worlds, social
scientists discovered as early as the 1920*s that they were
not the values which produced the greatest productivity or
satisfaction on the part of the subordinates. It was in tne
attempt to permanently change these attitudes that the Human
Resource Management System was introduced into the Navy.
Another behavioral norm which needs to be mentioned is
that associated with the Navy officer's attitude towards
change. As has been pointed cut, most approaches to change
are at tne individual level and do not try to adopt an
organizational point of view (Katz and Kahn, 1964). This is
a matter of simplicity in that the magnitude is much smaller
and more manageable, but the impact on the system is minimal
to non-existent. The individual is quite compliant with any
attempt to change either the structure or the processes of
the organization on the proviso that it will either leave
his own secure position in the hierarchy unaffected or with
increased power. Otherwise, he will marshall his resources
behind maintaining the organization's status guo.
79

The above mentioned attitudes are operant under
conditions cf an incremental approach tc changing an
organization, cut under wholesale crisis conditions, there
may be intuitive acceptance of the need for change if the
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Note the similarity to the forces which can ba marshalled
during inter rational conflict (Katz, 1965; sea Chapter II,
Section B, page 16).
Leadership has received a great deal cf visibility in
the Navy in recent years, and it too has behavioral norms
which are associated with it. The first and the easiest to
deal with is the concept of leadership as the Navy's
equivalent of the golden fleece--once you've got it, you
don't need much else. Every problem seems tc be related to a
breakdown of effective leadership, but there also seems to
be a lack of definitive guidance as to exactly what it is
that constitutes effective leadership, cr even what is
leadership. Host general maragement texts will define
leadership as the ability to influence the behavicr of
others. Note that this definition is completely devoid of
any concept cf organizational goals, the ccaacn good, etc.
Leadership is strictly a personality issue, not an
organizational one. It is also situational, that is, it is
specific for a particular situation and is not a capability
which one person will always have in all cases. In the
Navy, there is a distinct tendency to equate leadership to
management. In extreme cases, management may be considered
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as a subset of leadership with the most important function
of the leader being that of accomplishing the task.,
especially in a crisis (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972). A final
attitude towards leadership is based on the Navy tenet that
consistency is a virtue of the effecxive leader. Thus, once
a leader has found a style and theory of leadership which
works, that style should be set in concrete and used in all
conditions and in all organizations. The fallacy of this
approach is obvious, yet it is surprising how frequently
this belief is applied religiously.
Integrated with the norms on leadership are those
associated with management. Basic to these is the
conviction that good leaders do not need management
training. They already have all of the talents which they
need to run an effective organization. Here, as with crisis
management and leadership, management in general suffers
from a lack of definition. Again ' referring to most modern
texts, management is defined as the ability to accomplish
the organization's goals effectively and efficiently. Thus
it would appear as though leadership were a special subset
of managerial skills, not vice-versa. That they are
interrelated cannot be denied, but management would appear
to be the core important because of the inclusion cf the
organizational goals as an inherent characteristic.
One problem with management and managerial training is
the relatively nebulous nature of the skills imparted and
the extreme difficulty associated with determining
satisfactory measures of effectiveness to discover if, in
fact, the training has done any good. Accordingly, because
the cost-effectiveness and the contribution to combat
readiness can be quantified to a much greater degree, the
Navy has tended to substitute technology for management on a
wholesale scale. And, because of the fixation with being
"good leaders", naval officers generally reject tne

character of their own management styles (see the section on
organization processes, Chapter II, Section B, page 13;
March and Simon, 1958).
The last behavioral norm is one which has been mentioned
before, and that is the one associated with the reaction to
criticism which is evidenced by most naval officers. A
one-word description would be "defensive". The
organizational rationale for this behavior has been
mentioned several times: there is risk associated with
changing any procedure which was a success in the past. As
stated by Capt. K. G. Schacht, USN (Ret) in the Naval
Institute Proceedings (March, 1978, p. 116), "I'm staying
with waat I know will do the job." Subordinates in the
organization, after some experience within it, will quickly
recognize the dangers of offering criticism where it is not
going to support the beliefs of their superiors, even if
criticism is invited. An example of this is provided ty the
results of CINPACFLT's survey on the amount of agreement
with CDE Mumford's article in the Proceedings (September,
1977) . The responses were overwhelmingly against CDR
Mumford's position (approximately six negative replies were
received from the Surface Forces for every one positive
reply) . Interestingly enough, the letters to Proceedings
since publication of the article have been in support cf CDR
Mumford's statements by a margin of five to one." The
difference is that in the original survey the responses were
by personal message and the commanding officers here
officially accountable for their positions and their
statements. To support a position which was highly critical
of the higher levels of the Navy would be guite risky for
any person in such a position. The Naval Institute provides
an unofficial forum for the expression of opinion by naval
officers, and thus the risk associated with agreeing with
CDR Mumford is much lower. (A similar case can be made for
the Proceedings being a forum for all the malcontents in
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the Navy, and thus the accuracy of these results is also
questionable.) The answer appears to be that the
distribution of support and of opposition is distorted in
both directions, i. e., the actual conditions in the fleet
lie somewhere between the two extremes.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although a great deal of time and effort has teen
expended in the Pacific Fleet in the last few years
attempting tc eliminate crisis management, the effectiveness
of these effcrts has only been minimal. Crisis management
remains alive and well as a day-to-day method of doing
business. But as has been shown, it is not because of a
conscious choice on the part of Navy managers, but rathsr it
is a nearly inevitable result of an overgrown and marginally
*
controllable bureaucracy. For these officers who have chosen
to make their living within that bureaucracy, there are
certain norms of behavior which they must follow if they are
to te successful. In essence, crisis management is firmly
institutionalized and will continue to te passed from
generation tc generation of naval officers unless toth
structural and behavioral changes are installed and
enforced/ As with nearly all changes which are to be
introduced into large organizations, a positive reward must
be tied to the new and desireable behaviors. This means
that the fitness reporting system must be tailored to
reflect support of any programmed changes. This may be the
most difficult part of any planned change effort. If there
are no changes to the present organizaticn and tc the
behavior of the officer corps, it would te predicted that
the extensive retention efforts being made will for the most
part be ineffective, and both officer and enlisted attrition
will remain at an unacceptably high level.
This should not be construed as implying that there has
teen no progress. There is better stability in units'
schedules. Inspections have been combined, tnereby reducing
5U

the apparent overall number (in actuality, of course, the
units are inspected in just as many areas as before). There
has been some reduction of the administrative requirements
on the units. And there has been some reallocation of
dollars and of human resources tc support the fleet's needs.
But it must be recognized that tnese ara only treating
the symptoms of larger organizational ills.* The flattening
of the Navy hierarchy recommended by Bowers (1975) has not
been addressed in other than a superficial nature. ' There
has been little attempt to redefine the power structure
based on participative management and humanistic values.
Ihose efforts which have been made have been too shallow and
without any enforcement capability. These are rapidly
becoming organizational imperatives for the Navy.
The managerial tools which are available to fleet
commanding officers are inadequate. In today's world of
unstable environments and "enlightened" management, tae
Navy's reliance on its traditions of leadership and
followership is somewhat anachronistic. Continuing emphasis
on planning and adoption of the long-range viewpoint will
provide only a part of the answer. It is highly likely that
the wholesale adoption of the ;, plan cf action with
milestones" cased on the model of nuclear engineering
creates a structure of planning which is sc rigid that it
has no flexibility. This means that such miner irritants as
a delay in the delivery of a part needed for repairs or the
illness of a key Chief Petty Officer aecome "crises" because
a significant portion of the downstream events were keyed to
a delivery date or to one individual's expertise. The
frequent observation that so much time is spent in planning
that nothing actually gets done is an indicator of sucn
potential.
There are many management tools which are being
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developed which can enable the leader of an crganizaticn to
maximize the efficient and effective use of the time buffer.
The techniques and the categories under which they can Qe
grouped have been identified by the Navy Personnel Research
and Deveiopaent Laboratory, San Diego, California (Pahrar
at. al. , 1978), and are listed below:















(3) Path Analyzing Techniques
Incremental analysis
Procram evaluation and review technique (PERT)
Management information systems
Kepner-Tr egoe problem-sclving
















Unfortunately, most of these tools are not available to the
military manager in the Navy because of a lack of training
in their use. Those approaches to problems which were
successful in the past for a particular leader tend to
bacome established patterns of behavior (March and Simon,
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1958). For this reason, innovative approaches tc problems
tend to be discouraged despite tne opportunity for greater
effectiveness at a lower resource cost (Schacht, 1976) .
Some assistance can be expected when the broad scale
Leadership and Management Training program is fully
implemented. There are two cautions wnich must be accepted
in order to give the proper perspective to this program. Tne
first is a caution against over-enthusiasm: the LMT program
is superficial to some degree in that it is training, not
education. The difference is in the development of the
theoretical background and the depth of understanding cf tne
mechanics and interdependencies of the various elements of
management. The program can and will increase the
repertories within the Navy managers "bag of tricks", tut it
cannot insure a better fit of problems and answers. The
second caution is centered on an anticipated difficulty in
gaining widespread acceptance of this program in the
service. It may come as a bitter pill fcr a senior and
highly successful naval officer to oe told that he needs and
"will have" some training in management and leadership. An
indication of this can be gleaned from the problems which
are being experienced by the Human Resource Management
Centers in getting anything more tnan lip service frcm many
higher echelons in the fleet. It always seems to be "those
guys down there" who need the assistance, and a similar
dynamic can be expected with the introduction of the LMT
program.
It must therefore be concluded that the organizational
dysfunctions are not being addressed on anything more than a
superficial and piecemeal basis. This dees not mean that
those dysfunctions are not recognized, however. It is a
commentary on the naval officer's lack of mcral courage to
do what is needed rather than acguiesce to the political
reality of his career needs in a burgeoning bureaucracy. The
37

disparity in the response to CDR Mumford's article in the
message traffic and in the Proceedings reflects this.
It must also be concluded that the analysis of crisis
management and its impact on the fleet has been altogether
too soft. There is a pressing need for further investigation
under rigorous conditions in order to satisfy the high
standards of scientific research. Such research should be
done by a third party, i. e. , one which has no particular
stake in the problem or its solution and one which will not
be succeptible to political vulnerability. This should
minimize the "smokescreening" effect. detected in the
response to the Mumford article. Such an analysis would have
to be instrumented in part in order tc develop the
quantitative results needed for factor analysis, and it
would havs to be subjective in part in order to provide the
qualitative weighting of the factors. Such a study will
enable the Navy to get to the causes of crisis management
and actually address the problems, not the symptoms. An
essential element to this study would be an in-depth
evaluation cf successful units in order tc determine what
factors reduce or minimize the effects of systemic crisis
management. This would provide solid pointers for further
development of the Leadership and Management Training
program, and it could also begin to form the basis for a
"profile" which may be highly instrumental in selection for
command. Such an analysis of crisis management must receive
top priority both in the conduct of the study and in its
aftermath. This will of necessity involve an extensive
promulgation of the results of the study and a dedication to
responsive action. The effects of conducting a study and
then not providing the results or taking any action have
been mentioned before: the situation can be perceived as
being worse than it actually is. A continuance of the
status guo carries with it unacceptably high stakes for the
Navy and for the free world.

The talents of the Human Resource Management Centers can
be brought tc bear as an interim assist in correcting this
situation. Ihey are beginning to gain some credibility with
the fleet, and their job is centered about general,
effective management. Although the units have oeen exposed
to many of the technigues listed above which are available
through these canters, it is well recognized that the
lessons learned during the Availability week are rapidly put
aside in favcr cf the strictly task-oriented behaviors which
provide tea short-term successes the leaders want. Such
utilization of the HEM Centers would entail remanning them
back to their authorized levels or even above that. The
utilization of these centers on a long-term basis will
improve the situation, but it will not correct it per se. In
order for this effort to be effective, there must be
"leadership by example", another of the finest traditions of
the Navy. Every organizational level would be forced to
undergo a Human Resource Availability. Competencies at
participative management and effective listening would be
evaluated, and appropriate guidance would be provided to
each level in order to integrate the Navy's command
hierarchy into a an effective, "one- language" system. Unless
the new behavioral norms are adopted at the top, the lower
levels cannot be expected to do anything more than emulate
the officers who have made it to the upper reaches.
A method for establishing and maintaining stability
among priorities is an imperative. The units have get to
have some method of knowing what ranks where, otherwise the
tne uncertainty and the potential costs of a mistake will
remain sufficiently high to make them a very unpleasant
place in which to work. Such a prioritization system would
have to be very specific and would entail a significant
measure of accountability. This means that platitudes are
not going to be acceptable, and the priorities, once
established, cannot be changed with abandon. Although this
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portends to reduce flexibility of the Navy, there are two
qualities which can be built in which will minimize this
effect. The first characteristic is that the priority system
must be designed for negotiation when conflicts occur, which
they inevitably will. If the unit is overburdened, either
events must be dropped or the resources must be expanded
(not just the manhours)
.
The second quality is a function of the growing fleet
levels currently being experienced: provide each unit with
"flex-time". This would mean a commitment loading of only
eighty or ninety percent instead of the current one hundred
plus percent. Thus each unit wilj. have the time tc take
care of itself and would find the impact cf short-notice
commitments far less disruptive.
Crisis management has been defined as the short-nctice,
unprioritized, and unnegotiable expansion of the commitments
on an organization beyond the capabilities of its normal
resources tc respond to them all. These conditions lead to
the suboptimal accomplishment of the multiple goals. It has
been shown that the bureaucratic structure of the Navy and
the behavioral norms of Navy personnel support crisis
management. It is the primary conclusion of this study that
continuance cf the status que (operation of organizations on
the subcptiial plane repeated in Figure 9) cannot be
maintained if the Navy hopes to improve retention and to
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Figure 9 - SU30PTIMAL PLANE
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Units must be allowed the freedom to reduce the
information gaps and action deficiencies under conditions of
simultaneous goals, whether this be by reduction of overall
commitment leading or fcy improved managerial capaoilities.
The processes of managing the Navy need to be emphasized
rather than the ideals of "leadership". This will entail
the establishment of pragmatic, specific, attainable sets of
goals (i. a., the measures of effectiveness are included in
the goal definition) at each level in the organization which
integrate the objectives of both superior and subordinate
commands. Resources must be managed to these prioritized
objectives, and stability of both resources and objectives
must be realized. This, together with a simplification of
the Navy hierarchy, can reduce the lack of coordination, the
duplication, and the frustrations being experienced today.
We have long prided ourselves in the Navy on our ability
to respond on a global basis to any type of demand. Eut it
has extended neyond a pride in the ability tc respond; it
has involved the external image of a proactive world force,
one that was always pr e-positioned so that it would already
be there when it was needed. If this finest of all the
traditions is to be maintained, the Navy must restructure
itself and must rethink how it wants to do business. The
Navy must shift to a proactive stance en its internal
management.
"It may now be a fatal flaw if we are indeed into a
new epoch with our basic institutions structured tc
respond to crisis rather than to anticipate what is
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